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Jacob Mincer and Boyan Jovanovic 
In this essay we explore the implications of  human capital and search 
behavior for both the interpersonal and life cycle structure of interfirm 
labor mobility. The economic hypothesis which motivates the analysis is 
that individual differences in firm-specific complementarities and related 
skill acquisitions produce ‘differences in mobility behavior and in the 
relation between job tenure, wages, and mobility. Both “job duration 
dependence” and “heterogeneity bias” are implied by this theory. Ex- 
ploration  of  longitudinal  data  sets-National  Longitudinal  Surveys 
(NLS) and Michigan Income Dynamics (MID)-which  contain mobility, 
job, and wage histories of men in the 1966-76  decade yield the following 
findings, among others: 
1. The initially steep and later decelerating declines of labor mobility 
with working age are in large part due to the similar but more steeply 
declining relation between mobility and length of  job tenure. 
2.  Given tenure levels, the probability of  moving is predicted posi- 
tively by the frequency of  prior moves and negatively by education. The 
inclusion of  prior moves in the regression reduces the estimated tenure 
slope because it helps to remove the “heterogeneity bias” in that slope. 
3.  The popular “mover-stayer model” is rejected by the existence of 
tenure effects on mobility. 
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4.  Differences in mobility during the first decade of working life do not 
predict long-run differences in earnings. However, persistent movers at 
later stages of  working life have lower wage levels and flatter life cycle 
wage growth. 
5.  The analysis calls for a reformulation of earnings (wage) functions. 
Inclusion of  tenure terms in the function permits separate estimates of 
returns to general and specific human capital after correction for heter- 
ogeneity bias. A rough estimate is that fifty percent of  lifetime wage 
growth is due to general (transferable) experience and twenty-five per- 
cent to firm-specific experience and interfirm mobility. 
Sections 1.1-1.8  contain an exposition and empirical analysis which 
ranges over somewhat wider subject matter than Sections 1.9-1.11  which 
focus on the stochastic structure of  mobility processes. 
1.1  Introduction:  Renewed Interest in Labor Mobility 
Labor mobility is one of the central topics of  labor economics and a 
long-standing subject of  empirical research.  Earlier studies reflected 
primarily a concern with the allocative efficiency of  the labor market. 
They  analyzed attitudes, job change  decisions, and  the direction  of 
observed labor mobility in attempts to ascertain whether information, 
motivation, and behavior of workers were consistent with the postulates 
of  economic theory. 
In a comprehensive survey of this literature, Parnes (1970) concluded 
that the evidence on the operation of  market forces was mixed, both 
among different studies and even within them. Although research in the 
1960s was more sophisticated and utilized  larger data sets than prior 
work, it did not provide any change in perspective. 
Reviewing the more recent literature, Parsons (1978) finds promise in 
the emergence of theories of human capital and of search theories as tools 
for the analysis of  labor mobility, labor turnover, and unemployment. 
However, applied work in search theory has, thus far, only partially 
touched on problems of  labor mobility and of  unemployment: its em- 
phasis has been largely on conditions terminating job search, rather than 
on circumstances which generate it. 
The reformulation of  labor mobility as a human capital investment 
decision has been fruitfully applied to migration (Sjastaad  1962, and 
other work reviewed  by  Greenwood 1975). The connection between 
investments specific to the firm (and to larger units) and the incidence of 
industrial and occupational labor turnover has been elucidated in studies 
by Becker (1975), Oi (1961), and Parsons (1972). 
The novel approaches suggested by  human  capital and by  search 
theories are producing a renewed interest in the formerly stagnant field of 
labor mobility. A further source of  interest has come from stochastic 
models of labor mobility. The first of these, the “mover-stayer” model, 23  Labor Mobility and Wages 
appeared two decades ago (Blumen, Kagan, McCarthy 1955) and they 
have recently reappeared in more sophisticated form (Heckman 1977, 
1978; Jovanovic 1978b; for a review, see Singer and Spilerman 1976). 
The purpose of  this essay is  to explore the implications of  human 
capital and search behavior  for both the interpersonal and life cycle 
structure of  interfirm labor mobility. The apparent ambiguity in  the 
relation between labor mobility and wages which characterizes much of 
the literature surveyed by Parnes is implicit and reconcilable in human 
capital analysis; as a response  to perceived gains in  wages, mobility 
promotes  individual wage growth, but  to the extent that  on-the-job 
investments contain elements of  specificity, mobility is a deterrent to 
wage growth.  The study of  differences in  mobility behavior requires 
information over time; of  special importance, in our approach, is in- 
formation on time spent in the firm (tenure) and on the life cycle changes 
in job attachments. The availability of longitudinal microdata (especially 
NLS and MID panels) enables us to study these phenomena. 
The economic hypothesis which motivates the analysis is that indi- 
vidual differences in firm-specific human capital behavior lead, via wage 
effects, to heterogeneity in mobility behavior, and to “tenure effects” on 
attachment to the firm. Implications for life cycle mobility  are then 
derived in the absence or presence of  “aging” (changes in mobility with 
age,  at given tenure levels). Both  “tenure  dependence” and “heter- 
ogeneity bias” are implied by  the theory. We explore data sets which 
contain mobility histories to ascertain the existence of these phenomena 
and to  correct for the predictable biases. Next we investigate correspond- 
ing features of the wage structure. Labor mobility and tenure effects are 
introduced  and  tested  in  a reformulated earnings function in  which 
specific and general human capital accumulation can be distinguished. 
Sections 1.9-1.11  present a rigorous formulation of  the structure of 
mobility viewed as a stochastic process. 
1.2  Tenure, Working Age, and Mobility: Some Definitions and Facts 
We  define labor  mobility as change of  employer, whether  or not 
unemployment intervenes. We exclude exits from and entries into the 
labor force. This exclusion is a minor one for the male labor force which 
we study.’ Consequently, job separation is synonymous with job change 
in our data. Except for one illustration of observed differences (see table 
1.2), we do not distinguish here between separations initiated by  (or 
reported as) quit and layoff. Geographic, industrial, and occupational 
mobility are components of  job mobility which are included in  our 
concept but not singled out for separate treatment.2 
Two probabilistic relations, or  time profiles, are basic in our discussion 
and measurement of  labor mobility. (1) The “tenure turnover profile” 
S( T)  is the relation between the probability of separating from a job in 24  Jacob Mmcer and Boyan Jovanovic 
period t and the time spent in that job prior to t (current tenure T). In the 
language of renewal theory, S( T) is the “hazard function.” At the indi- 
vidual level this is a profile of  “propensity  to move” conditional on 
tenure. Such a profile is not observable. In large homogeneous groups, 
that is, groups consisting of individuals  with the same propensity S( T), we 
can observe estimates of  the probabilities in each period in the form of 
relative frequencies or separation rates conditional on tenure. (2) The 
relation between an individual’s propensity to move and working age, 
regardless of  his current tenure, is his  “experience turnover profile” 
S(X).  Again, this is observable as a relation between experience and 
separation rates. 
The most firmly established fact about labor mobility of all kinds is that 
it declines with age. It declines much more sharply with length of tenure. 
The declines in both S(X)  and S( T) are strongest initially and decelerate 
subsequently. Several tenure and age profiles of  separation rates are 
shown in tables 1.1-1.3. 
Table 1.1 shows the decline with age in the proportion of job changers 
(number of  job changers divided by  number employed) in  1961. The 
decline is similar when measured in terms of  number of  job changes 
rather than job changers, since a similar fraction (35%-40%) of  job 
movers in each age group changed jobs more than once during the year 
(BLS 1963, table A). 
Table 1.2 shows cross-classifications of  separations, quits, and layoffs 
by experience and tenure in the period 1971-73 in the two NLS samples of 
men (young men, ages 19-29,  and older men, ages 50-64,  in 1971). The 
tenure profiles within working age (experience) classes are steeply declin- 
ing and decelerating (convex). Mobility does not decline with working 
age at given tenure levels within each of  the cohort age ranges. The 
decline between the young and old cohort is pronounced, but it shows 
mainly in quits. 
The separation equations in table 1.3, derived from NLS panel data, 
summarize the conclusion that  within the two age panels declines of 
mobility with working age (experience), shown by S(X)  in tables 1.1  and 
1.2, are due to the effect of  tenure which is revealed in the regression 
S(X,T):  For young men, experience effects (coefficients  of X,  X2)  vanish 
when tenure (T, T2)  is included. No experience effects are observed for 
older men with or without the tenure  variable^.^ However, estimates of 
Table 1.1  Job Changers as Percent of Employed Men, U.S.,  1961 
Age 
18-19  20-24  25-34  3-  45-54  55-64 
Percent  23.5  24.4  14.9  10.2  7.1  4.0 
Source: BLS 1963. 25  Labor Mobility and Wages 
Table 1.2  Mobility by Experience and Tenure, Pooled, 1967-73 
(Percent moving in a two-year period) 
Experience  Tenure Level (years) 



















A.  Separations 
.47  .73  .58  .28  .07  .12  .04 
.38  .77  .60  .38  .08  .07  .06 
.11  .46  .16  .22  .10  .19  .04 
.ll  .40  .20  .15  .10  .16  .12 
.12  .51  .19  .19  .ll  .08  .08 
.12  .43  .20  .10  .10  .ll  .13 
B. Quits 
.32  .48  .41  .20  .06  .08  .04 
.25  .48  .42  .26  .06  .05  .07 
.06  .19  .22  .10  .ll  .04 
.07  .20  .12  .09  .08  .09  .  11 
.05  .18  .10  .10  .06  .05  .06 
.05  .13  .09  .03  .07  .06  .07 
C.  Layoffs 
.14  .26  .17  .08  .01  .05 
.12  .28  .18  .ll  .03  .02 
.05  .27  .16  0  0  .08  0 
.05  .21  .08  .06  .02  .07  .01 
.07  .33  .09  .10  .05  .04  .02 



























.04  441 
.06  1,499 
.04  1,998 









S(X)  and S(X,T)  in Michigan Income Dynamics data which cover the 
complete age spectrum (table 5, panel C, lines 1 and 2) show that net 
aging effects  remain even after the inclusion of  tenure, although they are 
reduced in size and significance. In all data sets the explanatory power 
resides mainly in the tenure variables; mobility is convex both in tenure 
and  in  experience; and the tenure profile is  much  steeper than  the 
experience profile. 
1.3  Wage and Mobility Structures: Some Theory 
We now turn to broad theoretical considerations with which we may 
analyze the facts of labor mobility. Some skills acquired in a particular 
firm are not transferable to  other firms. The acquisition of  such “specific” 
components of  human  capital by  workers and  the  consequent  wage 
pattern suffice to produce the tenure effects in the attachment to the firm 
which we observed in tables 1.2 and 1.3. At the same time, individual 
differences in amounts of  specific capital investment imply a heterogene- 26  Jacob Mincer and Boyan Jovanovic 
Table 1.3  Separate Equations (1%7-73) 
Young Men, Pooled 
S(X) = .486 -  .034X + .00ZX2  R2 = .02 
(5.2)  (3.6) 
S(X,T)  = ,692 + .WX -  .oooO2?  - .172T + .009T2  R2 = .29 
(1.0)  (0)  (19.7)  (16.3) 
Older Men, Pooled 
S(X)  = ,015  + .0028X - .ooOX2  RZ  = .003 
(.4)  (3) 
S(X,T)  = ,208 + .0035X - .oooOX2 -  .024T + .ooOS~  R2 = .10 
(.3)  (.2)  (6.4)  (4.1) 
Source: NLS  Tapes. 
ity in mobility, or in attachment to the firm (length of tenure), as well as in 
the strength of  tenure effects, that is, in slopes of the tenure-separation 
probability relation. 
The effects of  acquiring job-specific capital on mobility may be de- 
scribed as follows: successful  job matches eventually result in wage levels 
W which exceed expected alternative wages Wg.  The higher the wage W 
the less incentive to quit, given Wg  and the usual fluctuations in demand. 
Separations are high during the initial “probation” period and then drop 
to low levels. It is reasonable to assume that a successful match is only a 
starting point for a continuing employment relation which often involves 
investments of workers and firms in worker skills, and these are partially 
n~ntransferable.~  Employer investments involve hiring, screening, and 
training costs which are recouped by  a wage policy such that both quits 
and layoffs are deterred, that is, Wg  < W < VMP, where VMP is the 
worker’s value of  marginal product in the firm. 
Define W=  Wg+  W,, where W, is the worker return on his general 
(transferable) human capital and W,  is the difference between the (high- 
er) wage received in the firm  and the opportunity wage elsewhere (also 
W,).  Similarly, We  is the employer’s return on the costs of  investing in 
workers, the difference between the worker’s productivity (VMP) and 
the wage paid to him (W).  Workers are deterred from quitting, and 
employers  from  dismissing workers,  because  of  these  returns.  Total 
separations are affected by A =  (VMP -  W,) = W,  + We,  that is, by both 
components of returns to specific capital. In this paper we do not focus on 
the distinction between quit and layoff or consider the question whether 
employers and workers engage in joint or  in separate optimizing  behavior 
(but  see Mortensen 1978). Plausibly, W, and We are expected to be 
positively related: a good match and opportunity for joint investments 
are recognized by both employee and employer. 27  Labor Mobility and Wages 
The distribution of  returns to specific capital (A) creates individual 
(and group) differences in tenure-turnover profiles. Tenure profiles are 
horizontal only when A =  0, in which case tenure has no effect on mobility 
or on wages. With A >  0, tenure profiles of specific capital do not emerge 
instantaneously as the worker joins the firm. Specific capital is accumu- 
lated over time, given a successful  match, and the returns grow over time. 
Both the rate of  growth of  these returns and their ultimate level affect 
mobility: the “tenure effect”  is positively correlated with  both.  The 
convexity of  the tenure-mobility profiles, and concavity of  the tenure- 
wage profiles, are due to the eventual completion of  specific capital 
accumulation in the firm.j 
Thus the economics of  specific human capital formation predict the 
coexistence of heterogeneity and of  “tenure dependence” in accounting 
for mobility. The two aspects of  behavior are related and are not to be 
viewed  as  mutually  exclusive  hypotheses:  persons  who  favor  large 
volumes of  specific capital investment exhibit relatively little mobility 
(except for an initial period  of  repeated  search and occasional later 
moves) and strong tenure effects.6 Low  levels of  specific investment 
behavior,  whether intentional or due to inefficiency in job matching, 
imply high (persistent) mobility levels independent of  tenure (zero or 
small tenure effects). If  rates of decline of experience profiles of mobility 
reflect primarily the slopes of tenure profiles, as appears to be the case, 
the flat and high profiles of  “movers” and the downward-sloping  profiles 
of “stayers” imply a progressive divergence over the life cycle in observed 
mobility behavior of  a heterogeneous population. 
The growing divergence of mobility rates over the working age paral- 
lels the repeatedly observed  divergence of  individual life cycle wage 
profiles (see Mincer 1974). The human capital model can interpret both 
divergences as lifetime outcomes of unchanging individual differences in 
abilities and opportunities. This view cautions against literal impressions 
that older cohorts are more heterogeneous than younger ones, or against 
the notion that the experience of  longer tenure creates a “reinforcement 
effect,” that is, a desire to invest in specific capital. This is not to say, 
however, that such views are not valid. Habit formation and unexpected 
events do modify lifetime histories, but they need not be invoked in an 
initial analysis. 
The major implication of specific capital heterogeneity for the struc- 
ture of  mobility is the existence of  differential tenure effects. Levels of 
S( T) are higher and slopes flatter for individuals and groups who acquire 
little specificity in their human capital, while steeper slopes and even- 
tually lower levels characterize tenure functions of  large specific capital 
investors. Empirical observations should reveal steep downward slopes 
in tenure-turnover profiles uncorrected for “heterogeneity bias,” as well 
as “true” negative slopes after correction for bias. 28  Jacob Mincer and Boyan Jovanovic 
A related set of predictions applies to the wage structure: a major one 
is the existence of  tenure effects on wages which are additional to the 
effects of general human capital accumulation. This suggests a reformula- 
tion of the earnings function to include a tenure term. The experience and 
tenure coefficients should provide a decomposition of worker returns to 
general (transferable) and specific (nontransferable) human capital in- 
vestments.  As in the case of  mobility, it is also necessary to attempt 
correction for the danger of  upward biases in tenure effects which is 
posed by the existence of  heterogeneity. 
Other implications of  the theory relate to the effects of age (experi- 
ence) on mobility and wages S(X) and W(X). An interesting conclusion  is 
that mobility declines and wages grow with age even if  there are no 
“aging” effects, that is, even if mobility depended only on levels of tenure 
and not directly on age (given tenure). Similarly, wages grow (on aver- 
age) over the life cycle even if no general (experience) capital is accumu- 
lated. Also W(X) should be concave if  W( T) is concave, and S(X) convex 
because S( T) is. Indeed, without specific capital phenomena, the convex 
shape of  the age patterns of  mobility S(X) would be difficult to under- 
stand. 
1.4  Tenure Effects on Mobility in Homogeneous 
and in Heterogeneous Groups 
A simple heuristic model makes the notions intuitively clear:’ The 
propensity to move at the individual level, or the separation rate in  a 
homogeneous group, is a function: 
(1)  s =f(T,X) 
where s is the probability of separation in period t,  T is length of current 
employment in the firm up to time t, and X is total work experience 
(working age). The slope of  the age (experience) profile is: 
Here as/aT is the slope of  the tenure profile, dT/dX is the growth of 
tenure with working age, and aslaxis  the true age effect, if any. Note that 
0 <  dT/dX< 1, Tenure would grow by the same amount as age only in the 
case of perfect immobility: it increases initially with age since it is neces- 
sarily  short  at  early  stages  of  experience.  At  later  stages  dT/dX 
approaches zero as T approaches the fixed value [(  l/s) -  11  in the case of 
no tenure dependence, that is, when as/aT= 0. In the case of job specific- 
ity or tenure dependence, i.e., when aslaT<O, dTldXremains positive at 
later ages as  A regression of  T on X, not shown here, reveals a 
positive slope and slight concavity. 29  Labor Mobility and Wages 
Decomposition (2) yields the following conclusions about the observed 
decline of mobility with age: 
1. Even if  there were no “age effects” (ds/dX=O),  mobility would 
decline with age, because of job specificities, that is, because mobility 
declines with tenure (ds/dT<O).  No decline would be observed if mobil- 
ity were independent of  tenure (see part 2, theorem 2). 
2.  Again abstracting from age effects, since dT/dX<  1, the slope of the 
experience profile is less than that of  the tenure profile. 
3.  Convexity in  the tenure profile would  be  reinforced or simply 
reflected in the age profile if  dTldX decreases over time, or is constant. 
Moreover, this could happen even if there is an age effect and even if  the 
age effect were concave. 
4.  Decline of  mobility with age is faster the stronger the decline of 
mobility with tenure, apart from the pure age effect. 
Up to this point the analysis applies to a homogeneous group, defined 
by the identical S(X,T)  function for each of its members. Components of 
life cycle mobility can be observed directly in such groups by estimation 
of  equation (1). Generally, it is not possible to define homogeneous 
groups empirically, so that estimation of (1) cannot be carried out direct- 
ly. If  in fact individual propensities to move are not reduced by tenure, 
yet differ among workers, the observed group tenure profile S(T) will 
have a downward slope, and it is likely to be convex as well, because 
persons with high propensities to move are more likely to separate at 
early levels of tenure while those with low propensities are more likely to 
stay on a long time. The decline in the tenure profile consequently reflects 
the degree of  heterogeneity when measured by the variance in propen- 
sities to move, while convexity would reflect a decline in that variance, as 
only stayers remained in the long-tenure cla~ses.~ 
Let us now define a heterogeneous population  in consonance with 
specific capital heterogeneity as a collection of  homogeneous subgroups 
among which mobility rates differ at given levels of tenure, while tenure 
curves S(T)  decline in some or most of the subgroups. By the preceding 
argument, any degree of specific capital heterogeneity will lend a down- 
ward bias (steeper than average slope) to the observed group tenure 
curve. We should note that heterogeneity biases can exist without any 
true tenure effects, for reasons not involving specificity. But, if the tenure 
effect (d~/dT)~  is zero in each subgroup  i, the observed population experi- 
ence profile S(X)  will be horizontal, since its slope is an average of slopes 
in the subgroups. Conversely, if  (d~ldT)~<O  in each or some subgroups, 
the observed experience profile must slope down. Thus, in the absence of 
age effects, the age profile of  mobility S(X)  provides a clear test of  the 
presence or absence of  tenure effects in the group, regardless of  the 
group’s degree of  heterogeneity. 
As an  example, the popular  “mover-stayer”  model  (see Blumen, 
Kogen, and McCarthy 1955; Singer and Spilerman 1976), which assumes 30  Jacob Mmcer and Boyan Jovanovic 
heterogeneity and neglects tenure effects, must be rejected by the decline 
in the age-mobility profile, insofar as the latter is not exclusively due to 
pure age effects [aslaX<O in (l)]. 
Although the decline in life cycle mobility reflects the existence and 
strength of  tenure  effects,  it yields no information on the extent  of 
heterogeneity in the population. Assessment of heterogeneity is impor- 
tant, however, both in its own right and as a basis for recognition and 
correction of  bias in the estimated tenure effects. 
1.5  Empirical Mobility Functions 
An open-ended empirical procedure for estimating tenure effects in 
the presence of heterogeneity is to enter a number of variables which are 
likely to capture heterogeneous behavior in a regression of  tenure on 
mobility. The tenure slope estimate in the multiple regression is reduced 
compared with its value when it is the only right-hand variable. The 
reduction measures the extent of  heterogeneity bias due to these vari- 
ables. This procedure was applied to the NLS data and the results are 
shown in table 1.4. In addition to experience, the heterogeneity factors in 
the regressions were education, health, hours of  work, family status 
variables, industry, and union membership. In terms of  controbution to 
the adjusted coefficient of determination R2,  the last two factors were the 
most pronounced. The reduction in slope was about 20-30  percent for the 
young men, and larger (relative to the flatter slope) for the older men. 
This procedure is clearly incomplete for our purposes here, although of 
interest in the substantive studies of  particular factors. 
A scheme that is more general, in the sense that it does not require an 
enumeration of heterogeneity factors, derives from another definition of 
Table 1.4  Gross and Net Tenure-Separations  Slope, NU,  1967-71 
Young Men  Older Men 
1967-69  1969-71  1967-69  1969-61 
Sloped  RZ  Slope  RZ  Slope  RZ  Slope  Rz 
Gross 
Coefficient"  -.1420  .182  -.1100  .151  -.028  .12  -.027  .12 
Net 
&efficientb  -.0845  .200  -.0847  .165  -.016  .17  -.006  .20 
Heterogeneity 
Factors'  ,131  ,110  .07  .ll 
'Linear coefficient in the regression of  separation of  tenure. 
bPartial coefficient of  tenure (linear term) in the multiple regression. 
'Regression variables other than tenure. 
Tenure coefficients always highly significant (t >  4). 31  Labor Mobility and Wages 
a heterogeneous population: At a given level of  tenure, members of  a 
homogeneous group have equal probabilities of moving during the next 
period regardless of their past mobility, while in a heterogeneous group 
probabilities differ even at fixed current tenure. Since frequency of past 
mobility is an indicator of personal probability (“propensity to move”), 
which differs among workers, its (partial) correlation with mobility in the 
next period, given tenure, reveals the existence, and estimates the de- 
gree, of  heterogeneity. And to the extent that the prior mobility variable 
captures and therefore standardizes for differential mobility levels, its 
inclusion corrects the bias in the estimated tenure slope. 
Information on prior mobility was available in the NLS data for young 
men as the number of interfirm moves (NM) between 1966 and 1971. For 
the older men in NLS such information was not available, but we con- 
structed a variable (PM) on the number of  (survey to survey) periods 
between 1965 and 1973 during which at least one move took place.’O 
Table 1.5 presents, in  successive steps, regressions for young men 
(panel A) in which separations (job changes) in the period 1971-73  are 
predicted by years of work experience (X,  X2)  up to 1971; tenure (T, T2) 
in 1971; and mobility prior to the current job (NM). The prior mobility 
variable was also interacted with experience (XNM). The same regres- 
sions (except that PM replaces NM) predict job change rates of  NLS 
older men in 1973-75  (panel B), and of all MID men in 1975-76  (panel 
Briefly, the findings are: Inclusion of tenure (row 2) shows it to be the 
variable which is responsible for the gross age decline in  separations 
among young NLS men (row 1, panel A). Looking at rows 1 and 2 of 
panel B, we find that the older NLS men show neither gross nor net age 
(experience) effects. While net age effects are absent within the limited 
age ranges in the NLS data (young 5  29, old 2  50), they are reduced 
(going from row 1  to row 2 in panel C) but remain significant in the MID 
regressions which cover the whole age spectrum. The absence of  gross 
age effects (row 1,  panel B) in the older cohort reflects very smallotenure 
effects (slopes) at this stage. This is consistent with a strong convexity of 
tenure (and age) profiles over the long run. The comparable tenure 
slopes are much steeper for the young because they are dominated in 
regressions by early tenure levels. Indeed, in a subsample of older men 
whose tenure does not exceed eight years (not shown here), the tenure 
slopes are quite as steep as those of  young men. Thus, the differences 
between the young and the old need not be interpreted as a change in the 
mobility structure. 
The inclusion of  prior mobility variables shows the existence of heter- 
ogeneity in mobility behavior; the variable is a strong predictor of mobil- 
ity in the next period given experience and tenure at the beginning of the 
period. Persons who moved more frequently prior to the current job are 
C). Table 1.5  Mobility Functions s =f(X, T,  NM, Ed) 
Constant  X  X2  T  Tz  NM  X.NM  Ed  R2 
A. Job Change Rates of  Young Men in NLS, 1971-73  (n  = 1,595,  S= .375) 
.506  -.0424  .mo 
(3.98)  (2.44) 
(.61)  (.24)  (10.41)  (5.73) 
.612  -  .0064  .oO02  -  .lo71  .0057 
,547  -  .0034  .oO01  -  .W63  ,0051  .oO60 
(.32)  (.I71  (9.02)  (5.08)  (3.65) 
.547  -.0171  .oO03  -  ,0822  .0048 







,850  -  ,0253  .oO04  -  .0797  ,0047  .0032  -.0211  ,149 
Sample 
(2.37)  (.48)  (7.17)  (4.64)  (5.04)  (3.89) 
means  5.05  40.72  2.82  15.75  5.17  17.28  12.54 Table 1.5 (continued) 
Constant  X  xz  T  T2  PM  X.PM  Ed  R2 






so60  -  ,0165 
.5553  -  ,0282 
.5680  -  .0275 
.7551  -  .0344 
Sample 
mean  38.09 
B. Job Change Rates of  Older Men in NLs, 1973-75  (n  = 1,282, S= .091) 
.oO01 
(.22) 
.oO02  -  ,0172  .oO03 
(5)  (7.67)  (5.78) 
.oO04  -  ,0045  ,00009  .0921 
(35)  (1.57)  (1.49)  (6.82) 
.oO04  -  .0049  .o001 







.oO05  -  ,0052  .oO01  ,0024  -  .0026  ,098 
(.93)  (1.82)  (1.75)  (.79)  (6.62)  (.79) 
1464.78  16.42  415.26  .5226  19.89  11.67 Table 1.5 (continued) 
Constant  X  X2  T  TZ  X.SM  SM  Ed  R2 
.2285  -  .0099 
(4.08) 
.2m  -  ,0054 
(2.11) 
.2014  -  ,0063 
(2.46) 
.2329  -  .MI78 
(2.92) 
,3484  -  .0062 
Sample 
(2.42) 
mean  18.71 
C. Job Change Rates of  All Ages, MID, 1975-76  (S=  .116, n=  1,562) 
.o001 
(2.61) 
.00009  -  .0149  .o004 
(1.66)  (4.35)  (3.09) 
.o001  -  .0097  .oO02 
(1.95)  (2.71)  (1.91) 
.o001  -  .0107  .o003  ,0112 
(2.16)  (2.91)  (2.25)  (3.09) 
.oooO8  -  .0099  .o002 







.2175  -.0105  ,066 
(4.74)  (3.46) 
516.37  7.26  113.38  1.27  .095  12.64 
Note:  X=  years of  work experience;  T=  years of  tenure on the current job; Ed = years of  schooling; NM =  number of  interfirm moves in the period 
1966-71 of young men in NLS.  Adjusted to  length of  peeiod if  experience started after 1966;  PM = number of 2-year periods between 1965 and 1973  during 
which a job change occurred among older men in NLS; SM =number of annual periods between 1968 and 1975 during which a job change occurred among 
men in MID. Adjusted work experience started after 1968;  w =  logarithm of hourly wage; *=mean of  w;  S= mean rate of  job change (over a 2-year period 
in NLS, annual in MID); n =sample size; R2  =  adjusted coefficient of  determination; t= statistics in parentheses. 35  Labor Mobility and Wages 
more likely to leave the job earlier than others. Prior mobility appears to 
be a stronger predictor at older than at younger ages. When converted 
into an elasticity, prior mobility is also several times larger in the older 
group. Evidently, repeated mobility at an advanced age represents per- 
sistent mobility, suggesting little stake in job tenure or lack of  opportu- 
nity, while repeated  mobility at young ages does not have the same 
connotation. We tried to test the proposition that prior mobility at older 
ages is a better index of  heterogeneity  within each of  the panels: the 
experience-prior  mobility interaction variable, shown in row 4 of  each 
panel, with positive and significant. Incidentally, the existence of  this 
interaction implies that age (experience) profiles of mobility are not only 
higher but also flatter for movers (PM large) than for stayers (PM small), 
as we theorized in section 1.3. 
The introduction of the prior mobility variable was designed to sepa- 
rate  “movers”  from  “stayers.”  If  effective,  such  “standardization” 
should reduce the tenure slope in the regression. Tenure slopes are 
indeed reduced in row 3 and below in all three data panels. The reduction 
is small among the young and large among the old, as would be expected 
since PM is a stronger indicator of persistent mobility at older ages. The 
average reduction  in the linear tenure term at mid-experience levels 
(MID) is about one-third. That is, heterogeneity biases the steepness of 
tenure-turnover profile upward by about fifty percent, on average. The 
education variable shown in the last rows of table 1.5 appears to predict 
some reductions in mobility at given levels of initial mobility, but has no 
additional predictive power among the old. 
1.6  Net Age Effects on  Mobility 
Although they do not appear in the NLS regression of  table 1.5, age 
effects (coefficients of experience aslax) on mobility are present in the 
MID regressions in panel C and were seen in the decline of mobility rates 
at fixed levels of  tenure when the older cohort was compared with the 
younger  (table 1.2). The economics of  this downward shift in tenure 
curves may be found in the more traditional aspects of labor mobility: job 
change is a response to higher wage levels beckoning elsewhere as well as 
a search for specific investment opportunties. 
For a given wage gain, the supply response would diminish with work- 
ing age (at given levels of tenure), since the payoff period declines. Such 
effects, however, would not become pronounced until late in the working 
life, especially in view of  positive and not negligible discounting. Em- 
phasis on the effect of finite life (working age) on expected returns cannot 
produce a convex experience-turnover profile, nor can it rationalize the 
fact that the observed net age declines (as/dX)  occur relatively early in 
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mobility may decline early in the life cycle not because of the declining 
payoff  period  but because of  rising costs: in particular,  costs of  geo- 
graphic mobility rise with family size and the presence of  school-age 
children. 
Age effects are, indeed, more important in migration than in local job 
mobility. The decline in migration with age is steeper than the decline in 
local job mobility: one-third of young compared to less than ten percent 
of  older job changers migrate. But the greater costs of migration include 
also costs due to locational specificities which exist in addition to job 
specificity, so stronger “pure aging” is not the only reason for a sharper 
age decline in migration than in local job mobility: Tenure effects which 
reflect both job and location specificities are, indeed, sharper migrants. 
Another set of  age factors, unrelated to location, may operate in the 
early years of work experience: the range of quality of jobs and of the job 
match cannot be ascertained by mere search, and some knowledge must 
be acquired by actual experimentation. Also, job training and opportuni- 
ties for investment in general human capital may present  themselves 
sequentially in different firms. Beyond the first decade of working life, we 
may expect that human capital investors who eventually find a reasonably 
compatible work place develop a strong attachment to the job. 
1.7  Tenure and Mobility Effects in the Wage Function 
Specific capital investments imply tenure effects on wages which cause 
the tenure effects in mobility. Wage heterogeneity due to differential 
specificities similarly produces some of  the heterogeneity in mobility. 
Consequently, we should observe tenure effects in addition to general 
work experience effects in wage functions. Moreover, these effects may 
be exaggerated in empirical estimates in view of interpersonal diversity in 
specific investment behavior. 
Information on job mobility can and should be built into the standard 
earnings function. The inclusion of  the tenure variable should capture 
returns to specific (nontransferable) capital accumulation, permitting the 
experience  term  to measure returns to general  (transferable)  capital 
accumulation.  Information on prior mobility should also be  used  in 
correcting for heterogeneity bias. The explanatory power of the enriched 
wage function ought to be enhanced. 
The coefficients of  experience  (X)  in  the standard wage function, 
which includes only education in addition to the experience terms, reflect 
a gross effect dwldX which is a mixture of returns to general and specific 
capital: 
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The standard wage function has an upward-sloping and concave ex- 
perience profile (the  concavity is more pronounced when w =  log wage) in 
cross-sections and in longitudinal data." Its slope has been derived in 
human capital theory and in econometric studies. In view of  (2a), it is 
incorrect to interpret the coefficients  of experience dwldXas measures of 
returns to general human capital stocks. Such returns are measured by 
awlax,  that is, by coefficients  of experience when tenure is included in the 
wagefunction. Clearly dwldX overstates awlaxif specific capital is of any 
importance. The experience coefficients in the earnings function which 
omits tenure is an upward-biased measure of returns to general human 
capital accumulated on the job. 
It is interesting to note, according to (2a), that even if  no general 
capital were accumulated in the work career, wages would still rise over 
the life cycle, and, as a group average, the wage profile would tend to be 
concave so long as the tenure wage profile is concave and dTldX does not 
increase over the life cycle. 
Wage functions with tenure variables w(X,T) can be estimated in 
homogeneous groups without bias (homogeneity defined as the same 
tenure wage profile), but no such groups can be defined a priori: in the 
presence of heterogeneity, the tenure coefficient is likely to be exagger- 
ated, as in the case of mobility, and corrections need to be devised. More 
precisely, the bias arises because greater specificity produces larger dis- 
crepancies between the marginal product in the firm and the opportunity 
wage A =  VMP -  W,  =  W,  + We,  where W, is the specific return to the 
worker, and We to the employer, and A  as well as W, differ among 
workers and firms. A affects the length of tenure. It is plausible for W,  and 
We  to be positively correlated, because a fruitful match has to be recog- 
nized as such by both parties. Therefore W,  is a good index of A, and the 
tenure-wage coefficient which  attempts to measure  W, is likely to be 
correlated with expected tenure (see discussion of  theorem 3 below). 
Heterogeneity in W, is thus likely to produce  an upward bias in the 
estimates of tenure effects of wages, that is, of returns to specific worker 
investments. An additional source of  bias could result from a positive 
correlation between general and specific investments; here steeper ten- 
ure-wage curves would start at higher levels. To the extent that general 
returns to capital (W,) are not fully measured (standardized) by regres- 
sion variables, the bias will arise. 
Of course, positive tenure coefficients need not reflect wage growth in 
the firm. Higher wage levels (not growing with tenure) for the same labor 
in  some firms also  create  incentives to stay there longer.  Although 
transitional, this relation is likely to be widespread in a dynamic economy 
as an equilibrating phenomenon. Such supply adjustments to shifting 
demands are most likely to  involve younger people whose mobility is less 
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prior mobility is not a good index of  wage heterogeneity.  Similar and 
more long-lasting effects can be created  by  above-equilibrium union 
wages and nepotism. 
Can information on prior mobility be used in the wage function as an 
index of  relevant heterogeneity, that is, of  individual differences in W, 
and consequently in the wage-tenure coefficient? The answer is less clear 
in the wage equation than in the mobility equation. Positive serial cor- 
relation in mobility makes the link between length of tenure and mobility 
almost definitional whatever the source of heterogeneity in mobility. The 
problem for the wage equation is that bias in the tenure coefficient is only 
in part due to heterogeneity in specific  capital, and the latter is responsi- 
ble for only a part of  the heterogeneity in mobility. Thus prior mobility 
may be a weak instrument for elimination of  heterogeneity bias. Its role 
in wage formation is nevertheless of  interest to our study. 
Table 1.6  presents wage functions of the younger and older NLS men, 
and of all men in MID. The independent variables are the same as in the 
mobility functions in table 1.5; the dependent variable is the logarithmic 
wage.’* Row 1  is the “standard” wage function where the independent 
variables are education and experience. In the next row the tenure terms 
are added. In the third row we add the prior mobility variable, and in the 
last row we observe its interaction with experience. 
In the young men’s panel (A), the introduction of  tenure reduces the 
experience coefficients. At this stage (on average, five years of  experi- 
ence), wages grow 6.6 percent per year of experience (row 1);  4.3 percent 
as returns to general postschool human capital accumulation (row 2); and 
the remaining 2.3 percent owing to specific capital accumulation. The 
tenure coefficients are large and significant. Prior mobility is not related 
to current wages and does not affect the tenure coefficients. The coef- 
ficient of the interaction variable (XNM) is positive but quite small, and 
its introduction raises the tenure coefficient slightly. Apparently differ- 
ences in early mobility of  young men are not indicative of  future differ- 
ences in specific capital investments, nor do they capture differences in 
wage levels which are positively related to the length of  current tenure. 
In the wage function for NLS older men (panel B), the experience 
profile is a plateau, but tenure slopes are positive (and concave) though 
much flatter than for young men.” Still, the observed tenure effect is 
biased upward. Introduction of prior mobility cuts the linear term in half 
and reduces its significance. We may conclude that repeated mobility at 
an advanced stage of the life cycle is an indicator of persistent turnover, 
denoting little investment in specific capital. The mobility variable has a 
negative effect, showing that frequent movers have lower wages than 
stayers, given  education,  experience, and current  tenure.  This is  in 
contrast to the young whose past mobility did not imply a downward 
selection. We may conclude that intensive early mobility-about  a half of Table 1.6  Wage Functions 
Constant  Ed  X  X2  T  T2  NM  X.NM  R* 
-  .0311  ,0847 
(17.93) 
.0021  .0079 
(16.50) 
.0026  .0779 
(16.47) 
-  .0343  .0790 
Sample 
(16.64) 
mean  12.52 
A. Wage Functions of  Young Men, NLS, 1971 (a7,  = 1.28, n  = 1,442) 
,0658  -  ,0022 
(7.36)  (3.23) 
,0433  -.0011  ,0702  -  .W52 
(4.70)  (1.52)  (7.27)  (5.24) 
,0432  -.0011  ,0702  -  ,0052  -  .oooo3 
(4.69)  (1.53)  (6.99)  (5.17)  (.03) 
(4.29)  (1.46)  (7.49)  (5.49) 




.0011  ,231 
(1.98) 
4.97  39.94  2.78  15.06  5.29  17.48 Table 1.6 (continued) 
Constant  Ed  X  X2  T  T2  PM  X.  PM  R2 
,6733  .Of596 
(10.37) 
.5359  .0683 
(10.19) 
.6105  ,0666 
(9.88) 
.5996  ,0668 
(9.90) 
Sample 
mean  11.58 
B. Wage Functions of  Older Men, NLS,  1973 (W73=  1.59, n=982) 
,0113  -  ,0002 
(.I41  (.22) 
.0130  -  ,0002  ,0136  -  ,0002 
(.17)  (.24)  (2.9)  (1.58) 
,0157  -  .0003  ,0067  -.00006  -  ,0482 
(4  (.3)  (1.09)  (.4)  (1.8) 
(4  (.28)  (1.32)  (.  57) 




-.0011  ,201 
(1.52) 
38.05  1462.28  15.23  367.19  ,573  21.83 Table 1.6 (continued) 
Constant  Ed  X  X2  T  T2  SM  X.SM  R2 
C. Wage Functions of All Ages, MID, 1975-76  (ai175  = 1.69, n  = 1,560) 
,2437  ,0741  ,0467  -  ,0007  ,263 
(17.45)  (14.07)  (9.56) 
,2351  .0732  .0372  -  .o006  ,0305  -  .0007 
.2791  .0722  .0378  -  .0006  ,0264  -  .oO06  -. 1842 
(17.57)  (10.70)  (8.08)  (6.59)  (4.25) 
(17.33)  (10.91)  (8.32)  (5.44)  (3.49)  (2.94) 
,295 
,298 
.2541  ,0725  .0404  -  .0007  ,0249  -  .o006  -  .0150  .299 
(17.43)  (11.15)  (8.55)  (5.01)  (3.39)  (3.04) 
Sample 
mean  12.63  18.72  516.96  7.27  113.53  ,094  1.26 
Note: Regression variables same as in table 1.5. 42  Jacob Mmcer and Boyan Jovanovic 
the first decade in our NLS data-is  not necessarily an inverse index of 
longer-run tendencies to acquire specific capital or an index of inability to 
acquire a good job match. It may even be a positive index of efficiency in 
making wage gains by moving across firms or of greater intensity of search 
for an optional career. 
Taken together the findings in both NLS panels (A and B) show that 
tenure effects on wages are significant,  reflecting the firm-specific  compo- 
nent of  wage progress on the job. This component accounts for about 
one-third of wage growth per year in the early part of  working life. At 
young ages, past mobility does not clearly distinguish tendencies toward 
firm-specific human capital behavior. It does so, however, at older ages. 
At that stage lesser specific investments also result in lower wages, 
apparently as a result of slower growth over the past  decade^.'^ 
The wage function in the MID panel (C), which covers all working 
ages, indicates that  an  average  (and in mid-career)  the firm-specific 
component accounts for 20-25  percent of wage growth per year (differ- 
ence between  the X-coefficients in  rows 1 and 2).  Prior mobility is 
negatively related to  wages. The interaction term is also negative suggest- 
ing that men who continue to be frequent movers in the third decade of 
their working lives have both lower wages and flatter experience profiles 
of  wages. The inclusion of  prior mobility variables reduces the tenure 
slope by close to 20 percent. Thus, heterogeneity biases the tenure-wage 
slope coefficient upward by about 25 percent, half as much as it biased the 
tenure-mobility slope (panel C of  table 1.5). 
1.8  Tenure, Experience, and Mobility: Additional Remarks 
We used the generalized term “specific human capital behavior” to 
cover both the informational aspect of job matching and the theory of 
specific human capital investment. The former is a necessary condition 
for the latter, and both are required for completeness. 
There is another and popular view that the reality of tenure effects on 
mobility and on wages is largely institutional. The effects we analyzed are 
seen as “seniority rights” which include job security, pension rights, 
vacations, and seniority-based pay and promotion advantages. But the 
distinction is superficial. The “rights” themselves may well derive from 
human capital specificities in the presence or absence of  formal, espe- 
cially union,  regulations.  Indeed, recent  research  shows that  tenure 
turnover profiles decline and tenure wage profiles grow as much and 
more (!) in the nonunion as in the union ~ector.’~ 
In the past, experience coefficients dw/dX were sometimes crudely 
interpreted as returns to on-the-job general investments. In the wage 
function which includes tenure, the experience coefficients aw/aX effec- 
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contain both returns to on-the-job general investment and across-jobs 
wage gains due to mobility (but not to tenure). These across-jobs wage 
changes are positive in purposive quits especially in migration, but are 
often negative when job change results from layoff, “exogenous” quit, 
and job dissatisfaction (Bartel and Borjas, chapter 2, below). 
Over the life cycle, the effects of mobility on wages become increasing- 
ly less favorable at least as measured by money wages. Quits, migration, 
and occupational upgrading predominate in mobility of the young, but 
they become relatively unimportant at older ages. Since the frequency of 
job change declines over the life cycle for reasons already spelled out, the 
mobility component of wage growth declines over the life cycle as a result 
of  declines both in the size and in the frequency of  wage gains across 
firms. This is another aspect of  the well-known concavity of the experi- 
ence profile of  wages. 
Some models elevate the across-firm wage change to a single explana- 
tion of the typical concave life cycle wage profile: the worker is envisaged 
as moving up a fixed offer-wage distribution over his lifetime. Successful 
on-the-job search results in across-jobs wage growth. With a fixed offer- 
wage distribution, turnover declines with labor market experience. Thus 
older workers have a higher wage and a smaller probability of  future 
separation  .I6 
Although they produce concavity in the wage profiles, such models are 
quite inadequate as major explanations of  magnitudes of  wage growth 
over the life cycle (dwldX). In a calculation based on the Coleman-Rossi 
data, Bartel(l975) shows that no more than 25 percent of personal wage 
growth can be attributed to across-firms wage changes during the first 
fifteen years of work experience, when mobility is most pronounced. The 
models, therefore, neglect the bulk of the phenomenon they are trying to 
explain. Moreover, concavity in the wage profile does not require job 
mobility, in human capital theory, or in fact: Borjas (1976) found the 
typically pronounced concavity in wage profiles of  NLS workers who 
spent all of  their working life in a single firm. 
Although crude, our estimates of tenure and experience wage effects 
suggest that about 25 percent of  life cycle wage growth, which abstracts 
from economy-wide changes, is due to specific  capital investment. Taken 
together, the estimates provide a complete though very rough decom- 
position of lifetime wage growth: about 25 percent of it is due to interfirm 
mobility; another 20-25  percent to firm-specific experience; and over 50 
percent to general (transferable) experience. 
Perhaps the best way to summarize the life cycle relation between 
mobility and wages is to recognize that initial (first decade ?) job search 
has two major purposes: to gain experience, wages, and skills by moving 
across firms; and to find, sooner or later, a suitable job in which one can 
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part, evidence of  successful initial mobility, an interpretation which is 
corroborated by corresponding life cycle growth in wages. 
In both older and younger age groups, stayers and successful searchers 
grow  faster  than  unsuccessful searchers or  “noninvesting”  movers. 
However, a comparison of  movers and stayers puts successful searchers 
in the category of movers among the young, but in the category of stayers 
(they moved when younger) among the old. As a result, comparisons of 
stayers and movers show that young movers do as well as or better than 
stayers, but ultimate stayers show superior wage growth and higher wage 
levels in the later decades. 
We note, in conclusion, that “tenure and heterogeneity effects” are not 
restricted to job mobility. Whenever specific capital matters, comparable 
dualities between  returns (“wages”)  and turnover may  be  expected. 
Some evidence on this generalization is available in analyses of location 
decisions (Da Vanzo 1976), and of  marital instability (Becker, Landes, 
Michael 1977). 
In the second part of our paper we shall treat labor mobility and wage 
growth over the life cycle as related stochastic processes. We first focus on 
the evolution of  these processes for a given worker, interpreting our 
formulation within the context of  existing theories of  turnover and of 
wage growth and listing some of the implications of these theories. Next 
we take up the question of  unmeasured heterogeneity in the population, 
and the problem of  sample selection over time, known as the “mover- 
stayer” problem. A simple result is proved (theorem 3) which relates the 
behavior of  a heterogeneous group to the behavior of  the individual 
members of  that group. In interpreting the result, we  pay particular 
attention to the on-the-job-training hypothesis. Lastly, we  describe a 
method to estimate various parametrizations of the separation and wage 
equations. 
1.9  Evolution of Stochastic Processes 
Definitions: 
z =  parameter indexing a particular worker 
X=  the worker’s labor market experience 
t =  the worker’s job tenure 
Xo  =  market experience at which the worker started on his 
current job, so that, at each moment in time, Xo  +  t =  X 
Let 
F(tlXo, z)  =probability that for a worker of  type z,  job 
tenure does not exceed t on a job which 
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Letf(tlXo, z)  =  aF/at be the associated density, and let 3(t, Xo,  x)  be the 
“hazard function” of this distribution, defined by 3 =f/(  1 -  F).  Then 3 is 
the conditional density of job separation at tenure t, given that a tenure 




F(tlX,, z) = 1 -  exp [- JSb, X,,  z)  dy]  (3) 
There may be a positive probability that a job episode never terminates, 
in which case 
m 
lim F(tlXo, z)<l, i.e., Jib,  X,, z)  dy<w 
t-Pw  0 
It should be noted that F determines 3 uniquely and vice versa. Since 
f2  0, 3 2  0 so that F is nondecreasing. 
One purpose of  this section is to draw some parallels between wage 
rates and separation probabilities. Let &(t, X,, z)  be the mathematical 
expectation of the wage that worker z, with experience Xo +  t,  and tenure 
t, will receive.  It may be noted that both  GJ  and 3  are mathematical 
expectations conditional upon t,  Xo,  and z. 
Hereafter it is assumed that when a particular job episode terminates, 
it  is immediately followed by  a new  job  episode. That is, there are 
assumed to be no unemployment spells or spells of market nonparticipa- 
tion.  Given this assumption, consider now  the special case in which 
Waxo  =  dF/aX, =  0. Then each job episode is identically distributed. If, 
in addition, the job episodes are also assumed to be independently as well 
as identically distributed, then turnover becomes a pure renewal process 
(see Feller 1966, chapter 11).  In what follows,  we study processes that are 
more general than the renewal process. 
Let a(X, z) be the probability density that worker z will experience a 
job separation at the point in time at which his market experience is equal 
to  X.  (For the special case where turnover is a renewal process, a(X,  z)  is 
known as the renewal density.) Also let h(tlX, z)  be the probability 
density that a worker with market experience x  will have current job 
tenure equal to  r. Note that for this statement to be true, the worker must 
have experienced a job separation at exactly X=  t level of  market experi- 
ence, and no subsequent separations. Therefore, 
[ 1 -  F(XI0, z)  if  t=X 
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X  Then 
a(X,  z)=3(X,  0,  2) [l-F(XIO,  z)]+  J qt,  X-t, 2) 
=qx,  0,z)  [l-F(XIO,z)]+J3(t,X-t,z) 
h(tlX,  2)dt  0 
a(X-t,  z)  0 
(5) 
X 
x [l-  F(tIX -  t,  z)] dt 
Define y(X,  z) as the mathematical  expectation  of  worker  z's  wage 
conditioned only on his market experience. Then 
X 
0 
y(X,  2)  = +(X,  0,  2) [l -  F(XI0,  z)]  + J- 
qt,  X-t,  2) 
(6) 
xa(X-t,  Z) [l  -F(tlX-t,  z)] dt 
Now define two new functions 
s(t, x,  2)  =J(t, x-  t, z)-+sx=Jxo 
w(t, x,  2)  = *(f'  x-  t,  z)+  wx=  "xo 
and s, =  j, -  Jxo 
and 
and w, =  PG, -  $xo 
(where subscripts denote partial derivatives). 
Making the substitution into (5) and (6). 
X 
0 
a(X,  2)  =s(X,  x,  z) [l- F(XI0,  z)]  + J s(t, x,  2)  (7) 





y(X,  2)  = w(X,  x,  2) [l  -F(XIO,  z)] +J  w(t,  x,  z) 
Xa(X-t,  Z) [l-F(tIX-t,  z)] dt 
There are several reasons for choosing this approach. First, the deter- 
ministic earnings function approach (see, for example, Mincer 1974)  is a 
special case of the above formulation. In the earnings function approach, 
turnover is not considered explicitly, so that job tenure is not included in 
the regressions. Such regression equations are here interpreted as ex- 
pectations conditional on X  and on the measured component of  z,  and 
the expressions that characterize such conditional expectations are pro- 
vided in equations 8 and 11.  A set of sufficient conditions under which the 
conditional expectation of  the wage is a monotonically increasing func- 
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Second, the job-matching theory of turnover as developed in Jovano- 
vic (1978b) is fully consistent with the above formulation when the latter 
is restricted to sx =  wx  =  0 for all (X, t,  z), so that the turnover process is 
predicted by the theory to be one of pure renewal. The key assumptions 
in generating such a result are a constant rate of discount and an infinite 
horizon, and an assumption about the job search process that makes the 
latter “pure experience search,’’ in the terminology of  Nelson (1970). 
The model implies w,  >  0 for all t,  and  s,<  0 for large enough t and perhaps 
for all t. 
Two other search models that explicitly look at the implications for life 
cycle mobility are those of Burdett (1973) and of Jovanovic (1978a). Both 
models involve the worker’s moving up a fixed wage-offer distribution 
over his lifetime, with search of the “pure search” kind (Nelson’s termi- 
nology again).  Both  models imply that in  the absence of  on-the-job 
training, sx<O  and wx>O, while s,= w,=  0 for given X. When firm- 
specific human capital investment is introduced (Jovanovic 1978a), the 
latter prediction changes to s,<O  and w,>O  for all workers except the 
very old, for whom s,>  0 and w,  <  0 as they allow their human capital to 
depreciate toward the end of  their lifetime. 
General  on-the-job training raises wages, implying wx>  0 given a 
monotonic increase in general training over time. Since general training 
raises the worker’s productivity in many firms, it is not expected to affect 
turnover,  and therefore sx=O is consistent with  wx>O  and with the 
presence of general training. A somewhat different argument asserts that 
the presence of general training is the cause of  turnover at younger ages, 
because it may be optimal for the training to be acquired in  several 
different firms and such turnover is planned in advance. To the extent 
that such turnover is significant (and little evidence is available to support 
its significance), it may produce nonmonotonic effects on s(t, X,  z) for 
young workers as t and X increase. 
Next, define 
I 
H(t, x,  z)=Sh(~lX,  z)  dT20 
0  (9) 
so that H(0,  X,  z) =  0 and H(X,  X, z) = F(XI 0,z).  Then, integrating by 
parts in (7) and (8), one obtains 
X 
0 
u(X,  Z) =s(X,  X,  Z) -  S,  (t,  X,  Z) H(t, X,  Z) dt  (10) 
and 
X 
0  Y(X,  Z) =  w(X,  X,  2) -  S  wt (t,  X,  Z) H(t,  X,  Z) dt  (11) 
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The following results follow directly from equations 10 and 11,  and are 
presented in theorem 1: 
Theorem I: Let s,<O  and wt>O  for all values of  the arguments. Then 
a(0, z)  =  s(0, 0, z) and y(0,  z)  =  w(0, 0, z) 
ax(% z)  =  sx (0,  0, 2) + st (0, 0,z) 
Yx(0, z)  = wx  (0, 0, 2) +  wt (0, 0, 2) 
4x7  z)  >  S(X, x,  2) 
y(X,  z)  <  w(X,  X,  z)  for any X>O 
Proof:  The assertions follow from the observation that 
H(t,  X,  z) >  0 for any t >  0 and from H(0,  0, z)  =  0 
Next, consider the special case in  which  sx=O,  as would be  true  if 
turnover  was  a  pure  renewal  process.  We  then  have  the  following 
theorem: 
Theorem 2: Let s(t, X,  z)  be independent of  X.  Then if  st<O  for all 
(X,  t, z)  then ax<O  for all (X,  z). 
Proof:  Differentiating with respect to X in equation 10 and applying the 
assumption that sx =  0 yields 
X 
0 
ax(x, 2) =  St(X, x,  2) [l-  F(XI 0, z)]  -  J s,(t, x,  2) 
Hdt,  x,  2)  dt 
and since, by assumption,  s, <  0, it is sufficient to prove that Hx<  0 for all 
(t,  X,  z). But since s does not depend on X,  neither does F. Therefore, 
Hdt, X, z)= j  adX-y, z) [l-F(’yIX-  y, z)] dy. Therefore, 
Hx(t, X,  z) <O if  adX-y,  z)  <O for ally  E (0, X).  But then, ax(X,  z)<O 
for all X if  there exists an  E >  0, no matter how small, such that ax(X, 
z)  <O for XE  (0, E). But such an E  must exist if ax(X,  z) is continuous at 
zero, because by theorem 1,  ado,  z)  =  s,(O,  0,  z) +  sx(0, 0, z)  <  0. (The 
last inequality follows by  the assumptions of  the theorem.) This com- 
pletes the proof of  the theorem. 
Intuitively, one expects that theorem 2 should extend to the case where 
s,<O  and sx<O,  that is, to the case where the separation propensity 
declines with both tenure and market experience, and that the decline in 
the separation propensity considered as a function of market experience 
alone [a(X,  z)] should, if  anything, be reinforced. While this conjecture 
may be true, an attempt at proving it along the lines of  the proof of 
theorem 2 fails, because Hx  cannot be signed. 
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Theorem 2 asserts that the renewal density declines monotonically if 
the interevent waiting time distribution possesses a monotonically de- 
creasing hazard rate. Note that a parallel result for monotonically in- 
creasing hazard rate distribution does not hold. That is, s, >  0 everywhere 
does not imply that ax> 0 for all X, and an attempt at a proof along the 
lines of the proof of theorem 2 is quickly seen to fail (a counterexample is 
given in Brown 1940). 
It should be noted that y(X,  z) is the wage experience profile for a 
homogeneous group of  type z.  By  differentiating in equation 8, condi- 
tions may be derived under which the wage experience profile will be 
increasing and concave (yx  >  0, yxx <  0)  for each homogeneous group. 
These conditions involve restrictions on both w(t,  X,  z)  ands(t, X,  z). For 
example, one set of  suficient conditions for a monotonically increasing 
wage experience profile bx>O)  is: sx=O, s,<O,  w,>O,  wx>O  and 
wtX>O, as may be verified by  direct differentiation in (8) (and by  ap- 
plying the result of  theorem 2 which states that s,<O  and sx= 0 jointly 
imply ax<O everywhere). Assuming that sx= 0 is theoretically consis- 
tent with assuming that w,>  0, that is, the accumulation of purely gener- 
al on-the-job training raises the worker's productivity in all firms by an 
equal amount, and it raises his wage (hence wx>  0), but it is not expected 
to have any effect on his separation propensity (hence  sx =  0). Sufficient 
conditions for  concavity of  the wage experience profile may  also be 
derived but turn out to be much more complicated. 
Let T(X,  z)  be the mathematical expectation of  current tenure. The 
latter is distributed according to (4),  and, therefore, 
X 
0 




= x-  J H(t, x,  z)dt 
The second equality  follows after integration  by  parts.  Since H>O, 
T(X,  z) cannot exceed X. Differentiating with respect to X, 
X 
0 
T,(X,  2)  = 1 -  F(XI0, 2) -  J H,(t, x,  z)dt  (13) 
so that TAO, z)  = 1. If  turnover is a pure renewal process, with s,<O 
everywhere, then, from theorem 2, Hx>  0, and T,>  0 for all X. In other 
words, the average current job tenure will always be increasing for a 
cohort  of  workers  as their  market  experience increases under these 
assumptions. 
Let fl,  t2, . . . be the sequence of  completed job durations. Then the 
distribution function for the length of  the nth job episode is F(t, 1°C' 
ti, z). The ti  are therefore neither independent nor identically distributed 
random variables so long as the aging effect (sx)  is not zero. If  there is no 
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aging effect, then each job episode has the same distribution, and if, in 
addition, one assumes that the job episode durations are independently 
distributed, then turnover is a pure renewal process. Let n(X, z) be the 
number of job changes (the number of  completed episodes or the number 
of  “prior moves”) on the experience interval (0, X). Then 
X 
0 
E n(X,  z) = J a(t,  t)  dt  (14) 
To see this, note that a(X, z)  AX+  0 [(  Am2]  is the probability that 
exactly one job change will  occur in  the interval  (X, X+  AX). The 
expression in equation 14 is the sum of  these probabilities over such 
disjoint intervals as At  tends to zero. Dividing both sides of (14) through 
by X,  taking the limit as Xtends  to infinity, and applying L’HBpital’s  rule, 
one obtains 
Of  course,  (d/aX [E  n(X, z)]=a(X,  z), and  (d2/dX2) [E n(X, z)] 
=  ax(X,  2). Therefore, a monotonically decreasing experience profile of 
turnover implies concavity of the expected number of moves treated as a 
function of  experience. 
1.9.1  Example:  A Pure Renewal Process 
Let F be the mixed exponential distribution: 
F(tlX, z)=1--1  [e-“+e- (2 + W] 
2 
so that no aging effects exist. Then 
and 
b 
s(t, x,  z)=z+- 
1  +  ebt 
b2ebt 
s,(t, x,  2)  = -- 
(I +  ebq2 
The slope of the separation function is in this case independent of  z. If 
b =  0, then s, =  0, and so b is a parameter denoting the extent of duration 
dependence. Then let 
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The renewal equation (5) has for this case explicitly been solved by 
Bartholomew (1972) to yield 
b  a(x,  z) = [  f(~,  211  -  1 + (z + 5 -  [ QX,  211 -  1)e -  (2 
+
  Z)X 
2(2 + b)z  b2  ,-(z+=p  b  -  -  - 
2z+b  2(2z+b) 
so that 
b2  -(I+~)x  b 
ax(X, z) = -  Te 
If  there is no duration dependence with tenure (b  =  0), then separations 
also do not decline when considered as a function of  age. Notice also that 
a'y2(X, 2)  = -  x  ax(x,  2)  >  0 
so that although the s(t,  X,  z)  curves are  parallel in z, that is, (st2 =  0), the 
age curves are not-they  diverge. The relationship between the tenure 
and age curves is depicted in figure 1.1. 
The divergence of  age profiles therefore can be explained not only by 
divergences in levels of  specific human capital (as argued in part 1) but 
also as a purely statistical phenomenon. 
In this case, convexity of s(t, X,  z) implies convexity of  a(X,  z) in X. As 
b (the duration-dependence parameter) tends to zero, both a(z, z)  and 
s(t, X,  z)  tend to a constant, z. 
SEPARATIONS 
I  t 
TENURE, AGE 
Figure 1.1  Separations by age and by tenure. 52  Jacob Mincer and Boyan Jovanovic 
1.10  Group Relationships 
The individual-specific  parameter z is by assumption unobservable. It 
is an “incidental parameter.” The population distribution of z is assumed 
to be p(z)  with mean  pand variance  u.  The nondegeneracy of  this 
distribution gives rise to the dynamic version of  the sample selection 
problem studied below. 
Upon entering the labor market, a worker is assumed to be a random 
drawing from the distribution p(z).  On the other hand, a worker who is 
starting out on a job other than his first, at a market experience level 
X>O, is not representative of the entire population in the sense that he 
cannot be considered a random drawing from the distribution p(z). 
Althoughp(z) is interpreted to be an unmeasured personal characteris- 
tic, it is likely to be correlated with measured personal characteristics 
such as years of  schooling, race, sex, and so on. The unmeaured variabil- 
ity in separation propensities decreases as the number of personal charac- 
teristics held constant increases, which is another way of saying that part 
of the variance of  z is “explained” by the variance of  a set of  personal 
characteristics. (Note that this is quite different from the statement that 
the variance of  the conditional distribution is never greater than the 
variance of  the marginal distribution. The latter statement is false.) 
The objective now is to characterize the distribution of  z conditional 
upon Xand  t. Letp(z  I X)  be the distribution of z which applies to workers 
who are just starting a new job at experience level X.  Applying Bayes’s 
theorem, 
P(Z)  x=o 
It follows that p(z  I X)  is a continuous function of X  except at X=  0. [The 
continuity of p(z  IX) at X>O  follows if  a(X,  z)  is continuous.] 
Now let b(z  I Xo,  t) be the probability density that the worker is of type 
z7  given job tenure t and experience Xo+t. At the time he joined his 
current firm, the worker was drawn from the population p(z  lXo).  Ap- 
plying Bayes’s theorem again, 
Equation 16 follows because 1 -  F( tlXo, z)  is just the prob,ability  that the 
worker of type z will attain tenure t in a job which he started at experience 
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Writing 3(tIXO, z)  instead  of  ?(t, X,,  z) (thereby emphasizing the 
nature of  the conditioning), let 
(17)  qt,  X,)=Js^(tIX,,  z)p(zIxo, t)  dz 
be the probability that the worker will experience a separation at tenure t 
given X,  and t. We then have 
Theorem 3 
$(t, X,)=Ji,(tlX,,  2)  p(Zlx0, t)dz-a2(~IXo,  t) 
+,(t,Xo) =Jk,(tIX,,  Z)i)(ZIX,, t)dz 
-  Cov(3, kI  x,,  t) 
(18)  and 
where +(X,,  t) is the mathematical expectation of the wage given X,  and 
t, where  c?(SIX,,  t)  is the variance  of  $(tIX,,  2)  in  the population 
p(z  I  X,,  t), and where Cov(i, +  I X,,  t)  is the covariance of $(t  I X,,  z)  and 
k(tIX,,  z)  in the populationF(z IX,,  t). Before proving this theorem, we 
elaborate on the meaning of its assertions. When t is increased by one unit 
while Xo is held constant, tenure and experience both increase by one 
unit. Therefore, s,  is the sum of  the tenure effect and of  the pure age 
effect, and similarly for w,.  In words, the first assertion of  the theorem 
may be expressed as: The slope of the average separation rate is equal to 
the average of the individual slopes, minus the variance of the separation 
rates in the current populationfi(z I Xo,  t). This result is an extension of an 
earlier result of  Barlow, Marshall, and Proschan (1963). Their result 
states that mixtures of  decreasing hazard rate distributions also possess 
decreasing hazard rates. 
Suppose that there are no true age or tenure effects on separations, so 
thatj,(tIX,,z)  =Oeverywhere. Then,3,(t,Xo) = -c?($IX,,t),sothatthe 
group separation rate declines although the individual separation rates 
are constant. Furthermore, j(t,  Xo)  would in this special case be convex in 
t (which would be consistent with the evidence presented in table 1.2), if 
u2(9  I Xo, t)  declines monotonically with t. For a wide class of distributions 
p(z  lXo), one would expect such a monotonic decline because the selec- 
tion  out of  the sample as t  increases is such that  “movers”  are (on 
average) selected out leaving behind only “stayers,” so that the sample of 
those left behind becomes increasingly more homogeneous. But c? need 
not decline monotonically, as is demonstrated by the following example. 
Assume that at any Xo,  p(z  I  X,) is such that z takes on only two values, 
say 1  and 0, and that the z = 1  workers have a higher separation propensi- 
ty than do the z =  0 workers. Assume that the initial (t =  0) sample is such 
that nine-tenths of  the workers are z = 1  types and that the remaining 
one-tenth are z =  0 types. Then the initial variance of  z is (1 -  .9).9 = .09. 54  Jacob Mincer and Boyan Jovanovic 
As tenure increases, the population proportions shift toward the stayers, 
and the variance of  z  increases steadily up to .25, at which point the 
population  proportions  are  equal.  Thereafter, the  variance  declines 
monotonically to zero.” Of  course, a monotonic decline would occur 
even in this example if  the initial proportions happened to be equal, or 
were weighted in favor of  stayers. 
According to the first part of  equation 18, the change in the group 
separation rate is always an overstatement (in the negative direction) of 
the average of the individual changes. However, the same is not true of 
the group wage change, because the covariance term in the second part of 
equation 18 may be either positive or negative. The relevant question is 
whether a “mover” [for whom S(t, X,) -  i(t  IX,,  z)  is negative] would 
expect to receive higher or lower wages than a “stayer” at a certain tenure 
level given that it was optimal for both to remain in thefirm up to that time. 
A theory which predicts that a worker will separate from a job on which 
wages paid to him were low relative to his prior expectations implies 
nothing about this question. 
The implications of human capital theory for the sign and magnitude of 
Cov(6, SIX,,  t) are ambiguous. In part 1 we emphasized the role of 
firm-specific human capital in generating a wedge between the worker’s 
productivity in his current firm and his productivity elsewhere. Consider 
the polar case in which the ratio of general to firm-specific  training is fixed 
and constant across workers, but in  which workers differ in the total 
amount of  training that they undertake.  Suppose that  z  is  an index 
inversely related to the worker’s propensity to invest in on-the-job train- 
ing. Under these assumptions, a higher propensity to invest also implies a 
higher investment in specific training, so that iz(t  I X,,  z) >  0. Assume that 
z is not correlated with unmeasured  ability components. Then, since 
investment in training involves foregone earnings early on in return for 
higher earnings later, this implies that wZ(t  I X,,  z) >  0 for young workers 
(for whom X, and t are small), and w,(tIX,,  z)  <O for older workers. 
Therefore, Cov(6,  S I X,, t)  is positive for the young and negative for the 
old workers. 
Suppose instead, however, that the total amount of  training across 
individuals (with given X, and t and other observable characteristics) is 
constant while only the ratio of general to specific training varies posi- 
tively with z. Now, high-z workers have higher separation propensities 
because their training is general in nature rather than firm specific. In 
view of the well-known argument (see Becker 1975) that general training 
is financed by the workers, such workers earn lower wages initially, and 
higher wages later on, than do “stayers” whose training is  more firm 
specific  in nature. (Again, this conclusion depends on the assumption that 
the preference for the type of  training is not related to unmeasured ability 
differences.) The implication now is that Cov(3, 6  IX,, t)  is negative for 
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Neither polar case is expected to obtain in practice. Both the total 
amount and the composition of  the training may be expected to vary 
systematically  with z.  But which dominates? The wage function estimates 
reported in table 1.6  strongly suggest that the dominant variation is in the 
total amount of training. This inference is made by comparing the second 
row with the fourth row in panel A, and the second row with the third in 
panel B. The variables PM and NIM are indexes of past mobility and are 
correlated with $(t  I Xo,  z). By definition, z is the unmeasured component 
of  heterogeneity, and the inclusion of  PM and NIM therefore has the 
effect of reducing the absolute value of  Cov(+,$ IX,,  t). In both panels, 
there appears to be an effect of  this reduction. The wage growth, mea- 
sured as the sum of the coefficients on X and T, increases for the young 
men when NIM is included, and decreases for the older men when PM is 
included in the regression, and these changes are consistent with the first 
polar case, but not the second, as is clear from equation 18. 
Proof:  Substituting for @ into (17), 
Differentiating with respect to t in equation 16, 
+  [I- F(tlX0, Z)lP(ZlXo)  Sf(tlX0, z>  P(ZlX0)dZ 
[S(1 -  F> PdZI2 
(20) 
=[-s^(tIX,,  z)+S"(t,  xo)]p(zIxo, t) 
JS"(tIX0, Z)Bt(ZIXo, t)=J(t, XcJ2- Js^(tIXO, 2)2pdz 
Multiplying both sides by 3(t  I X,,  z)  and integrating both sides over z, 
(21) 
=  [E(s^)]2  -  E($) = - d(S^  I xo, t) 
and differentiating with respect to t in equation (17) and using equation 
21, one obtains the first assertion of  the theorem which has therefore 
been proved. Next, 
G(Xo, t)=  JG(tlX0,  z)  @(zlXo,  t)dz 
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where  the second  equality follows in  view  of  equation 20,  and this 
completes the proof of  the theorem. 
1.11  An Estimation Procedure 
The following estimation procedure exploits the property of p(z  I X) 
(defined in equation 15) of  having two different functional forms, im- 
plying, in turn, two different functional forms for i(t, Xo)  in (17). We 
demonstrate below how identification of the parameters may be secured 
by subdividing the sample of  all workers into two subsamples: one for 
which Xo  =  0 (workers on their first job ever), and the other for which 
X,>O.  In fact, in the following illustration for an additive fixed effect 
parametrization of  s(t, X, z),  the parameters are overidentified, which 
suggests that identification may be secured for more complex functional 
forms which we hope to consider in future work. The following additive 
fixed effect formulation is perhaps inadequate in capturing the individual 
differences, but it is adequate as an illustration of  the estimation method. 
Let 
(22)  s(t, x,  2)  =  z +  S(t, X) 
where, without loss of generality S(0,O)  =  0. One possible way to proceed 
is to take first differences in equation 22 and eliminate z,  thereby also 
eliminating  the  selection  bias.  There  are  two  problems  with  this 
approach. First, using differences in separation probabilities as the de- 
pendent variable leads to coefficients that are not significant. Secondly, 
there is then no possibility of  estimating u2,  the variance of  2. We have 
therefore chosen a different procedure, which is based on deriving two 
separate relationships associated with equation 22. 
Let z(t, x)  be the conditional expectation of  z,  and s(t,  X)  the con- 
ditional expectation of the separation rate, given t and X. Then, taking 
conditional expectations in equation 22, 
(23)  s(t, x)  =  z(t,  X)  +  S(t, X) 





F(tIX-t, z)=1-exp  [-zt-JSb, X-t+y) dy] 
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(Workers with X=  t are on their first job.) Assume now that p(z)  is the 
norma1 distribution. Then a straightforward calculation yieIds 
z(X,  x)  = p-2  x 
where p and u2  are the mean and variance of  z. 
So that (for workers on their first job) 
(25)  S(X, X)  =  p,  +  S(X,  X)  -  u2X 
The discontinuity of thep distribution at X=  0 carries over to z(t,  X).  It is 
seen from (24) that 
40,  0) =  P 
while taking the limit in (24) and observing (7), 
lim  z(0, X)=p+-  2 
X’O  P 
To obtain a closed form approximation to z(t,  X)  for X>  t,  a first-order 
Taylor’s expansion is performed in equation 24 around the point (t =  0, 
X=  E) where  E >O.  Then 
=  lirn  z(0, E) + [lim  z,(O, E)]  t 
E’O  e-0 
+  [lim  zx(0,  E)]  X 
E‘O 
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Evaluating the limits, and using theorem 1, 
where (Y -Sx(O,  0) and y =  S,(O, 0). 
Zfp(z)  is a symmetric distribution so that the third order moment about 
the mean is equal to zero, then one obtains Iz3pdz=p3+32p,  and 
therefore 
d.  lim  z,(O,  E) =(F-~-  1) (a+y) + 1-32-  k2+, 
E’O 
Also, 
lim  zx(O,  E) = -+a  2  +  Y) 
P 
E’O 
Taking an expansion in (23), 
s(t, X)  = d+  yt +  z(t,  X)  +higher order terms 
But making the substitution into (26), 
z(t,  X)=P+-+[(~,-~+  d  l)(a-y)+ 1-32-p2+$]2 
P  P 
-<(a +  y)X+  higher order terms 
P 
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2  (27)  s(t, X)  =  P- +F+ [(F-’-  1) a  +  p-’y  + 1 -  32-  p2 
+  -]t  02  + [a  --$a  2  +  y)]x 
P-2  P- 
+higher order terms 
Also, expanding in (25) 
(28) 
Equations 27 and 28 are the two basic relationships estimated. 
The  separation  propensity  is  of  course  unobservable.  All  that  is 
observed  is whether or not  an individual has changed jobs within a 
particular period. Let y = 1  if  the worker has changed jobs within the 
period (X,  X+  AX),  and zero otherwise. 
s(X,  X)  =  p  +  (a  + y -  a2)X+  higher order terms. 
=s(t, X,  z)  AX+O [(AX)’] 
Similarly 
Prob b=O)=l-s(t,  X,  z)  AX+O [(AX)’] 
Therefore yx has a mean equal to s(t, X,  z) AX+  0 [(AX)’] 
Ignoring the 0[(Am2] 
yx=  [Z +  S(t, X)]  AX+  u 
where u is a disturbance with zero mean. In the data, AX was equal to 
two years. The regressions for the separation equations are reported in 
the first two columns of table 1.7. (Separate regressions were also run for 
quits and for layoffs, and they are reported in the table, although they do 
not have an interpretation within the mathematical structure presented 
above.) The three linear coefficients and the two constant terms provide 
five restrictions on the four parameters so that the parameters are over- 
identified. However, the relative magnitude of the two constant terms is 
reversed from that implied by the theory, leading to an estimate of 2 
which is negative, which may mean that the additive fixed effect formula- 
tion is inadequate. In future work, we intend to experiment with different 
functional forms for the separation and wage equations, focusing on the 
question of  the best way to model the individual differences, and to 
organize the data so that the time interval AX  is shortened, one year 
rather than two. 60  Jacob Mincer and Boyan Jovanovic 
Table 1.7  NLS  Young Men’s Sample,  1967-73 
Separations  Quits  Permanent Layoffs 








.78  .64 
-  .1805  ,0137 
(23.22)  (1.13) 
.0098  -.@I12 







.305  ,246 
1,877  1,985 
383  .4439 
-.1112  ,0051 
(14.55)  (.4) 
,0057  -.0005 







.167  .lo6 
1,877  1,984 
,103  .1999 
-.0692  ,0086 
(12.51)  (.844) 
.0042  -.o006 
(9.09)  (.862) 







1,877  1,984 
Notes 
1. The subject of  women’s labor mobility is reserved for separate study. 
2. For analysis of  geographic mobility see Bartel (1978)  and Mincer (1978). 
3. This is in contrast to the BLS data of Table 1.1  and may be peculiar to the NLS sample. 
4. In  his  work, Jovanovic (1978b)  has shown that job-matching processes produce 
downward sloping tenure-separation functions and upward sloping tenure-wage functions. 
Investments of  employers and workers in their mutual association are a corollary. We use 
the language of  specific capital to cover the combined phenomena. 
5. We may note that even if returns to specific capital accumulation,  and in particular W,, 
did not decelerate with tenure, but grew in a linear fashion, the resulting growth of  the 
reservation wage in job search would  nevertheless lead to decelerating declines in the 
probability of  quit, given a declining upper tail of  the wage-offer distribution. 
6.  We must be careful, however, not to assert the converse: by itself, inertia does not 
bring about specific investments. 
7. The deterministic treatment is for expository  convenience only. See part 2  for a more 
formal and more specialized analysis of  the stochastic process. 
8.  Perhaps a simple way  of  illustrating the conclusion that dT/dX is larger with than 
without tenure dependence is to consider a case in which we go from none to some tenure 
dependence. Let the mean tenure in the group be T,, and the overall turnover rates. Then, 
after a passage of  a year, the (1 -  s) stayers have increased tenure by one year, while the s 
movers, without tenure dependence, have lost on average T,,  years of  tenure. The net 
change  dT/dX is  therefore  (1 -s)  -sT,  which  approaches zero  since  T approaches 
[(Us) -  11. Now, let s  remain the same, but the process become tenure-dependent. In this 
case, the average tenure lost by  movers is T,,,,, <  T,, since proportionately more of  them 
are  drawn  from  low-tenure  classes.  Consequently  the  net  gain  in  tenure  dT/dX 
=  (  1 -  S) -  ST,,,  >  (1 -  S) -  ST. 61  Labor Mobility and Wages 
9.  Cf. theorem 3 in part 2. Such a decline in the variance need not be inconsistent with a 
widening of differences in mobility rates. 
10. For those men whose current tenure started before the initial year of  reported prior 
mobility (1965 for the older men and 1966  for the young men in NLS,  and 1968  for MID), no 
information on PM is available (12% of  young men and 62% of  the old men in NLS, and 
about 50% in MID). As a check on the results in table 1.5 which implicitly assigns a value of 
PM=O to those whose tenure is too long, we  used dummy variables on the complete 
samples, and we also replicated  the regressions  of  table  1.5 on the  subsamples which 
contained information on prior mobility. The results were quite similar to those in table 1.5 
with one interesting feature:  the tenure coefficients for the old men in NLS  (with short 
tenure in the subsample) were as steep as  for the young, and the inclusion of PM reduced the 
slope by a relatively small amount as it did for the young. 
11.  The longitudinal evidence is less familar. See Borjas and Mincer (1978) reporting 
Coleman-Rossi data, and Anderson, Balcer, and Diamond (1976) on the Continuous Work 
History Sample. 
12.  Dollar wage equations, not shown here, show similar patterns, but weaker predictive 
power. 
13. This is true also in the sample with Ts8,  in contrast to the short-tenure mobility 
equation (see note 10). 
14. Supporting evidence is shown in the Bartel and Borjas paper in this volume, as well as 
in previous research by Borjas. Borjas (1975) classified the older NLS men into movers and 
stayers. The latter were defined by  the fact that their current job was the longest ever. 
Education and experience were only slightly different in the two groups. The movers had 
lower wages (about 25%) and flatter experience profiles. 
15. See Freeman (1978), Borjas (1978), and others. The flatter union tenure slopes have 
been  analyzed as effects of  union policy.  We suggest that they may also reflect lesser 
heterogeneity in the union compared with the nonunion sector. 
16. See Burdett (1973), Sorensen (1975). Jovanovic (1978a) is an adaptation of  Burdett, 
which allows for on-the-job human capital accumulation. It is doubtful, however, that the 
assumption of  a &xed wage-offer distribution can be maintained for workers whose skills are 
growing and changing over the life cycle. 
17. This example was supplied by R. Shakotko. 
18. Helpful comments by J. Heckman on an earlier version of  this paper have led to 
considerable improvement of this section. 
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